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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OF EPHRAHI, a

Utah corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
HALBERT DAVIS, STEVIE KAY
STEINI1AN:N, BABYLON CORPORATION, PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
SAVINGS, FIRST STATE BANK,
THE UTAH TAX CO~~ISSION, and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 14514

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
BABYLON CORPORATION

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant Bank of Ephraim appeals from a decision
of the Sixth Judicial District Court as to the priorities
of certain judgment creditors on a Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court awarded judgment on a Decree of
Foreclosure to the judgment creditors, Bank of Ephraim,
Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
?1ssociation and the Utah State Tax Commission, as per the
complaints of each creditor.

The rights of the defendant

Steinmann were previously assigned to defendant Babylon
Curporation.

The defendants, First State Bank and United

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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States of America, were previously dismissed as parties
defendant to the action.
In its Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, the Distri:·
Court, in addition to awarding judgments to the judgment
creditors, assigned priorities to the judgments of ea~
creditor, as set forth in the appellant's StatementofFact.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to sustain the entry of judgment and
priorities as set forth in the court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of the issues raised in this appeal, re·
spondent substantially accepts the Statement of Facts of
ap!Jellant, with several clarifications and additions as fol·
lm•TS:

l.

Appellee Babylon Corporation has interest only in

the cafe property.

Babylon Corporation obtained this inter:

by assignment from Steven Kaye Steinmann.
2.

The mortgage that Halbert Davis gave to Steinmann:.:

given the same day that the Bank of Ephraim note was give~·
August 7, 1970.
3.

(See defendant's Exhibit #5).

The Steinmann mortgage \vas recorded after the Ba~\

Ephraim mortgage, but on the same day - August 10, 1970.
defendant's Exhibit #3).

At the time of the recordation o:

' of Ephralm
· h a d a dvanced on.
the Steinmann mortgage, the BanK

$2400.00 on the Bank of Ephraim note.

.
Any monles
a dvan"ed:
"

the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property over and above
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were advanced after the recordation of the Steinmann mortgage,
and were purely optional.
4.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 9).

The Steinmann mortgage was recorded at the request

of Tibbs & Tervort, who then were counsel for the appellant,
Bank of Ephraim.

(See defendant's Exhibit *3).

The fact that

the deed was prepared by the escrow department of the Bank of
Ephraim, and was recorded at the request of counsel for the
appellant is important in establishing that as of August 10,
1970, the appellant had actual notice of the Steinmann mortgage.
5.

As stated by the appellant, "the mortgage to Steven

Kaye Steinmann expressly sets forth the fact that it was
secondary to the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim."

What the

appellant failed to mention is that the Steinmann mortgage
expressly sets forth that it be second in lien priority to the
Bank of Ephraim mortgage in the amount of $2400.00.

(De fen-

dant's Exhibit *3).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT BANK OF EPHRAIM HAS NO BASIS
IN LAW OR IN FACT FOR ITS APPEAL AGAINST
THE APPELLEE, BABYLON CORPORATION.
Throughout its arguments, appellant addresses itself to
appellee Prudential Federal Savings, and only in the closing
one-half page is Babylon Corporation even mentioned.

Appellant

would have the Court believe that the facts of the Babylon
mortgage are in relevant parts similar to the facts of the
Prudential mortgage.

Such is not the case.

The Babylon mort-

gage differs from the Prudential mortgage in two very important
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

respects.

First, the Bank of Ephraim had actual

noti~c

the Babylon mortgage, and thus was put on notice of ali;·
superior to its future optional advances.

Second, all a:·

vances made by the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property 1,
made after the giving of the Steinmann mortgage.

As wiL

pointed out below, these two fact differences render ina~;.
cable all of the appellant's arguments as appellant wooU
have the Court apply them to Babylon Corporation.

Indeed,

the cases cited by the appellant support conclusively the
posi~ion

of the appellee, Babylon Corporation.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE BANK OF EPHRAIM HAD ACTUAL
NOTICE OF THE BABYLON NORTGAGE, AND ALL
OF THE APPELLANT'S ADVANCES WERE MADE
AFTER THE RECORDATION OF THE BABYLON
MORTGAGE, THE BABYLON LIEN HAS PRIORITY
OVER ANY NONIES OPTIONALLY ADVANCED BY
THE BANK OF EPHRAIM.

The appellant has admitted from the beginning that thi
advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional and not
obligatory under the mortgage.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 9).

Autiwri ty almost universally advises that such advances, lif'
given after notice of subsequent interests, do not haw
p:::-iority over such subsequent interests.

The universal rui•

is quoted quite succinctly in Leche v. Ponca City Prod~
Crecit Association, 478 P.2d 347, 350

(Okla. 1970):

"The applicable rule of law is stated in
36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, §234: 'The greater
array of authority, however, is found on
the side of the doctrine that advances
made after notice of subsequent interests
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4.

do not have priority over such interests.
This rule has been applied to
subsequent liens and encumbrances as
well as to subsequent grants of the
property.
The mere specification in
the senior mortgage that the further
advances are not to exceed a fixed sum
does not vary the rule. The rule is
especially applicable where the advancements are optional with the
mortgagee ... '
In 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, §230, at 299,
the rule is stated:
'In accordance
with the general rule, after notice of
the attaching of a junior lien, the
senior mortgagee ordinarily will not be
protected in making further advances
under his mortgage given to secure such
advances, at least where he was under
no binding engagement to make such advances.'"
The above cited case is not a materials men case, yet it
does come down strongly to support Babylon's position.
Other courts almost universally agree.

In Kimmel v. Batty,

168 Colo. 431, 451 P.2d 751, 753 (1969), the Supreme Court of
Colorado approves of the rule that " ... if it is optional with
the mortgagee to make or refuse the advances, he will be protected by the security of his mortgage only as to

~advances

made before the attaching of the junior lien or encumbrance."
(emphasis added) .
The Supreme Court of \vashington, in National Bank of Wash81 Wash.2d 886, 506 P.2d 20, 29

ington v. Equity Investors,
(1973), also strongly agrees:

"Thus, we are adhering to what we perceive to be the weight of authority ...
Optional advances under a construction
loan agreement attach when the advances
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5.

are actually made.
Anj liens attaching prior to an optional advance would
thus be superior to it, and attaching
afterwards, junior to it."
The Idaho Supreme Court has also come down on point:
"A senior mortgage for future advances
will maintain seniority for advances
made after actual notice of a junior
lien if, but only if, there was a contractual obligation to make such advances existing prior to the notice of
the junior lien." Biersdorff v. Brumfield, 93 Ida. 569, 468 P.2d 301, 302

TI97Dl.
The appellant cites Savings
106 Cal. 514, 39 P. 922, 926

Loan Society v. Burnett,

&

(1895) as being controlling.

that case, quoting from Tapia v. Demartini,

77 Cal. 387, :

641 (1888), the California Court states:
"But the lien of the mortgage cannot
be enforced against subsequent encumbrances, of which the mortgagee has
actual notice for advances or endorsements made or given after such notice."
A review of other cases cited by the appellant indicae'
that Imva, Indiana and Alabama, as well as virtually all (
jurisdictions, support the position that optional advance'
a prior lienholder, after that prior lienholder has been'·
notice of subsequent interests, do not have priority ave:;.
subsequent interests.
210 NW 559

(1926); Corn Belt Trust

Plaine v. May,
Zahrndt,

(See Everist v. Carter, 202 Iowa~;:
&

Savings Bank of~

19 7 I ow a 54 , 19 6 N\'l 7 3 5 (19 2 4 ) ; ~

148 Ind. 447, 47 NE 335, 337

lvarehouse Co. v. Barnett Bros.,

(1897); ~

273 Ala. 435, 137 so. i;

(1931); Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn,
253, 255 (1941)).
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6.

In reaching this rule of law, the courts have followed
good sound reasoning and policy.

If the courts allowed a

first mortgage holder to make optional advances with priority
ad infinitum, even after receiving notice of a second mortgageholder's interest, it would spell the death of the second
mortgage.

In the instant case, it should be obvious to the

Court that the Babylon-Steinmann mortgage would not have been
accepted for security if Steinmann had known that the Bank of
Ephraim would attempt to take priority on all future optional
advances, totally contrary to the law.

The appellant Bank of

Ephraim indicates that any future lienholders have the responsibility of ascertaining the true amount of indebtedness
outstanding at the time that the second mortgage is put into
effect - even \vhen the amount cannot be determined from the
face of the mortgage (Appellant's Brief, p. ll).

This is

true, and Steinmann took all possible steps to protect herself, by indicating that her mortgage was second to that of
the Bank of Ephraim in the amount of $2400.00.
amount already advanced) .

(The exact

Bank of Ephraim, being the escrow

agent in the Steinmann transaction, had actual notice of the
above restriction.

Therefore, in law and in policy, Bank

of Ephraim should not receive priority over Steinmann-Babylon
for any monies advanced after notice and recordation of the
Steinmann-Babylon mortgage.
The Court '.-Jill note that the above panoply of law indicates
that the Babylon Corporation should receive priority for all
amounts over the $2400.00 already advanced at the time of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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7.

Steinmann-Babylon mortgage, rather than amounts over $}O
as decided in the court below.

00 .•

Although Babylon Corporat· I
10.11

did raise this point in the court below, i t has not proferre
t.'l.is point as a grounds for appeal and, therefore, does not

I

ask for reversal of the lower court's judgment.
POINT III
THE INCLUSION IN THE BANK OF EPHRAIM
MORTGAGE OF THE TYPEWRITTEN PHRASE
"THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED
$3000.00" LIMITS THE BANK'S PRIORITY
AND RECOVERY ON THE MORTGAGE TO
$3000.00.
Although the multiplicity of authority under Point II
should suffice to obtain the results for which the appellee,
Babylon Corporation, asks, there is also solid authority w\::
indicates that the $3000.00 limitation typed onto the

Banko:/

Ephraim mortgage also may be conclusive.
Appella..1t contends that the printed word in paragraph i
of the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, wherein it states "and for
i

all of which this mortgage shall stand as a continuing secu::!
I

until paid" should supercede the large typed statement lhat
"this mortgase covers all additional advances on this loan,
the total principal amount not to exceed $3000.00."

The

typed statement is obviously a limitation on the mortgage
security, and is irreconcilable with any statements which•;:
allow unlimited security.

pe1·1
The Bc-,r.~:. of Ephraim mortgage was prepared by t h e aP '1
lant., and thus should be construed most strongly against
" ... In case of uncertainty as to the
meaning of a contract, it should be
construed most strictly against its
framer ... "
(Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. 323,
Funding for400
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1

Additionally,
"Where there is a printed form of a
contract, and other words are inserted,
in writing or otherwise, it is to be
assumed that they take precedence over
the printed matter."
(Holland v. Brown,
15 U.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 78 (1964)).
In the same light, Steven Kaye Steinmann was justified,
when reviewing the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, to believe that
the written (typed) word would take precedence over any ambiguous printed statements.

A mortgage cannot be both "for

any other indebtedness at any time existing from the mortgagor
to the mortgagee," and limited in principal amount "not to
exceed $3000.00," unless the total debt outstanding is always
$3000.00 or less.

Because of the typed clause in the instant

case, once the principal amount reaches $3000.00, any additional advances would not be secured under the mortgage.
A fine Utah case in point is General Mills, Inc. v.
Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 P.2d 1089 (1943), in which a unanimous decision was rendered, and has stood the test of time of
over 33 years.

In the General Mills case, there was a chattel

mortgage securing the mortgagors' obligation to pay for turkey
feed, drawn by the mortgagee.

That mortgage contained two

clauses which are amazingly similar to the clauses in question
in the instant case.

First, in the body of the printed mort-

c;age, it is stated that the mortgage was security for "all
other sums no'd or hereafter due or owing from the mortgagors
to the mortgagee."
hu11ever,

Closely following was the limit "provided,

that the ma::imum amount, the payment of which is to
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be secured hereby, is $3750.00."

The court decided thatbot:

clauses could not be operative; that there was an irrec

. I
onc11-,

able ambiguity, and therefore rules of construction and inte)
were to be followed.

Quoting from the text of the opinion

page 1093:
"It is so elementary that an ambiguity
in a ·,ritten instrument is construed more
strongly against the party who drew the
instrument that citation of authorities
should be unnecessary.
This is especially
so where the one drafting the instrument
has the advantage of a lender of money."
(emphasis added) .
After a thorough consideration of law and policy, the
court finally stated, at 1094, that:
"We are constrained to hold from a consideration of the language of the contract in its entirety, the contract res
and the relation of the parties to each
other, that the parties intended by their
agreement to enter into a chattel mortgage to secure the sum of not to exceed
$3750.00 by a lien ... "
The similarities in the two cases are striking.
involved mortgages.
mortgage papers.
as well as a

Bothe

In both cases the mortgagee prepared t/.1

Both cases have an 'unlimited' security c!:

'limiting' clause.

The law in Utah is clear.

there is a limiting clause in a mortgage, "the mortgage inw:
is in fact for an liquidated amount with a maximum ... " (GI'
Mills, supra, at 1093).
As applied to the case at bar, the General Nills case
clearly indicates

:hat any priori ties that the appellant Bali

of Ephraim could have on the secured cafe property stop at

$3000.00, as indicated on the fact of the mortgage.

To gra:·

r cut:
1 ea-

would
be Funding
going
against
33 years
c
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10.

la'.v, as well as policy which dictates that arr.biguities in
";r'. tten instrurr.ents (and in particular, recorded instruments
designed to give notice)

should be construed most strongly

against the preparer of the instrument.
CONCLUSION
The appellant argues almost exclusively against Prudential Federal Savings, and never comes on point against the
aopellee Babylon Corporation.

As extensively cited in Point

II, the universal rule is that advances given after notice
of subsequent interests do not have priority over such subsequent interest.

Finally, the $3000.00 express limit as

typed onto the face of the mortgage limits any priorities of
t~e

Bank of Ephraim under the mortgage of $3000.00.

Both ex-

tensive law and common sense policy dictate that the judgment
of the lower court should be affirmed in its entirety as i t
applies to the appellee Babylon Corporation.

Respectf~lly submi~~~,
')

/

s.

J /

-l_.....-·
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lRex L'ewis·, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Babylon Corporatio~
120 East 300 North
1
1
Provo, Utah 84601
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